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The Legacy of Multics and Secure Operating Systems Today
Part 1: Timeline
The idea of the secure modern operating system began with Multics in 1963.  “For secure 
operating systems, the ideas of reference monitor, protection systems, protection domain transitions, 
and multilevel security policies” (Jaeger, 2008, p. 23) and other security concepts we take for granted, 
began with the developers of Multics. It was a revolution, as it was a timesharing system—as opposed 
to the batch systems that would process jobs in sequence, one at a time.  Multics was “designed from 
the start for security” and “more secure than other contemporary (and current) computer systems” 
(Karger & Schell, 2002).  This paper aims to look at modern “reasonably secure” operating systems in 
light of the legacy of Multics and the research along the way.
Multics was unique in that “information protection has been permitted to influence the entire 
system design” (Saltzer, 1974).  Saltzer provided five principles inherent in Multics: the default 
situation should be lack of access; there should be regular audits that maintain current authority; the 
design should be open and collaboration should be supported by peer review; it should incorporate the 
principle of least privilege; and lastly there should be ease of use so that the user doesn't have to think 
about the underlying design (Saltzer, 1974).  Most apparent is that Multics was unique but also 
continued and improved the product of past research (e.g. extending the use of addressing descriptors 
in protecting primary memory—the foundation of which came from a system called Burroughs B5000).
A theme we follow through the development of projects like Multics is the foundation of 
collaborative development.  Known weaknesses are corrected “as rapidly as feasible” (Saltzer, 1974). 
This could be akin to the present-day open source software movement and the benefits of the 
ticket/versioning control systems like GitHub, GitLab, or Beanstalk.
Clearly Saltzer, Karger & Schell, Corby, Schroeder, and Vyssotsky were the prominent and 
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productive researchers of Multics from inception at the 1965 Fall Joint Computer Conference in Las 
Vegas.1  The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) led annual symposia on Operating System 
Principles as well as publishing Multics research in Communications of the ACM.2  At the heart of 
Multics was research and scholarly communication in the academic sphere.  Their work was to describe
the architecture of Multics, offer critiques, and offer solutions and ways to move forward.  The best 
example of this discussion may be Schroeder who offered the paper Security Kernel Evaluation for 
Multics (1975) in which the critiques of Multics lead to the idea that a security kernel should be added 
and the conceptual work being done to define and structure the security kernel.  The stated goal was to 
be able to perform an audit and verify the correctness of information protection and initial functions of 
Multics.
The topic of secure operating systems is still very popular among researchers.  Although 
Multics as a project is not heavily discussed in white papers or secure operating system listservs3, the 
legacy of Multics is foundational. 
1    http://multicians.org/papers.html
A voluminous collection of Multics research with a link to further research collected at the Computer Security Paper 
Archive Project at UC Davis, California.
2  https://sigapp.org/sac/
ACM is still very active today with the annual and now 32nd Symposium on Applied Computing (2017).  Interestingly, 
Corby won the ACM Turing Award in 1990 and the talk is entitled “Building Systems That Will Fail”
3   https://secure-os.org/desktops/charter/
“Secure Desktops is a mailing list for the discussion of security and privacy challenges in open source desktop computing 
systems.”
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Part 2: Annotated Bibliography
This part will look at research from the inception of Multics to current secure operating systems.  The 
articles are arranged alphabetically to aid in locating sources.  Each entry addresses a few given 
questions and an explanation to the credibility and relevancy of the research.
Colp, P., Nanavati, M., Zhu, J., Aiello, W., Coker, G., Deegan, T., ... & Warfield, A. (2011, 
October). Breaking up is hard to do: security and functionality in a commodity hypervisor. 
In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (pp. 
189-202). ACM.
This paper presents Xoar which is a modified version of Xen that retrofits isolation principles used in 
microkernels onto a “mature virtualization platform” (i.e. Xen).  This is necessary because with Xen or 
Hyper-V hypervisors we see that the TCB is in fact quite large.  This large “control VM” houses device
emulation, system boot, administrative tools—and it is a liability.  To address the problem of a large 
TCB, the authors note that the history of OS development says to break it into smaller pieces, isolate 
those pieces, and reduce each to the least privilege necessary to do its tasks.  To harden the TCB, Xoar 
developers have disaggregated Xen's control VM and brought about new capabilities: a bootstrap VM 
that's disposed of once the system starts; a secure audit log that makes it possible to see a component's 
dependencies in the case of a vulnerable package; 'rearchitected' critical services using isolation and 
microreboots that make it so an attacker would have to exploit two isolated VMs to compromise the 
service.
The TCB is responsible for the security policy of the computer and encompasses hardware, firmware, 
and software.  The Xen hypervisor runs at the highest privilege level so a compromise of any 
component could potentially allow the attacker access to other services and interfaces (e.g. exploiting 
XenStore key-value storage, which runs with dom0 privileges, would lead to system-wide 
vulnerabilities).  Using the CERT vulnerability database4, the researchers found that 21 of the 23 
current attacks ranging from buffer overflows to DOS attacks, were against the service components in 
the control VM.
dom0 is responsible for exposing devices to the guest VMs.  Devices may be virtualized, passed 
through, or emulated.  For virtualized devices, Xen handles the shared memory and keeps the ACL in 
grant tables.  For devices to be passed through, Xen can assign direct access of devices to other VMs.  
Lastly, an emulation layer is handled by a per-guest Qemu instance for “commodity OS's” that expect 
to be run on a standard platform.
 
Xoar and dom0 disaggregation are being pursued in Qubes, and the work of these researchers is 





Laiserin, Jerry. (2000). The Pre-History of Internet Collaboration.(Technology Information). 
Cadence, 15(12), 59.
Continuing the central theme of collaboration, this paper traces the history and culture of collaboration 
in computer science.  The author notes that Multics “indirectly spawned the collaborative-computing 
revolution of today” by inspiring Thompson and Richie to develop UNIX for interactive access on a 
shared or collaborative basis.  UNIX's inherent collaborative nature and Bell Lab's cheap or free 
licensing of its non-telephone-related technologies meant that UNIX witnessed widespread adoption 
leading eventually to a lineage including Windows NT, Mac OSX, and Linux.
The author describes the personal computer revolution as a cultural aberration or a detour from the 
collaboration that preceded it: in the PC world of 1980's users had “my” files in “my folders.”  Lotus 
Notes was the first commercially-viable system that connotes “groupware” in its repository of shared 
documents, threaded discussion, and its support of work “within and among groups of collaborators—
hence the term 'groupware' and the slogan 'communicate, coordinate, collaborate.'”
This paper, written in 2000, builds on the work of William Nickerson who crafted “A Taxonomy of 
Group Computing Applications” in a 1997 issue of Group Computing magazine.  Of course this 
discussion predates collaborative coding repositories like GitHub (founded in 2008) and collaborative 
writing in Google Docs (2006).
Lesueur, F., Rezmerita, A., Herault, T., Peyronnet, S., & Tixeuil, S. (2010). SAFE-OS: A 
secure and usable desktop operating system. Risks and Security of Internet and Systems 
(CRiSIS), 2010 Fifth International Conference on, 1-7.
SAFE-OS is a secure operating system project using virtual machine containers with a shared standard 
desktop interface.  This original research looks at related work in both kernel-based containment and 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) systems (e.g. SELinux and AppArmor) as well as other 
virtualization-based containment (e.g. SVFS, NetTop, Bitfrost and Qubes OS).  As opposed to a very 
complex kernel or the high administrative costs of a MAC system, type 1 virtualization technologies 
like Xen hypervisor provide much simpler and auditable virtualization code that leads to higher trust 
and security.
The authors examine the shortcomings of other virtualization projects: in SVFS7 a corrupted 
application can access and alter user data as SVFS only secures the integrity of some system files; in 
NetTop (built on top of VMware and SELinux) the user gets completely isolated VMs with no way to 
share data securely between them; in Bitfrost the user doesn't have fine-tuned access to the VM but 
rather generic capabilities like access to the webcam; in Qubes there are no constraints to running any 
application in any container—the roles are present but not enforced.
The paper describes an exquisite and secure base Xen environment called dom0 that all 
communications proxy through.  Unprivileged security modules run on specific ports at dom0 and only 
“accepts incoming connections to specific proxy services that implement the security modules of the 
7 https://github.com/macan/SVFS
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appliances.”  A GNOME desktop environment runs on Main Env but itself has no internet access: it 
solely communicates with appliances “to control and display them.”  
The OS is designed with three critical appliances: Mail (via Thunderbird)8, Trusted Websites 
(whitelisted and https only via Mozilla Firefox), and Unauthenticated Websites (similar to Trusted 
Websites with the exception that port 80 is allowed).  There are also sandboxed VMs: one sandbox is 
for untrusted websites, and the other sandbox is for Office applications.  These sandboxes are, by 
design, self-contained so even malicious code could be run without the risk of affecting other VMs.
Communications among the VMs (Lesueur, F. et al.,  2010,  p. 3)
Even the displays are virtualized as each appliance uses an SSH tunnel and VNC to display in Main 
Env.  X-server runs on base, dom0.  SAFE-OS's base VM also performs automatic updates at boot so if 
there was malicious software (outside of personal files) it would be removed when the VM updates. 
Transferring files is antagonistic to the containment design so the developers created a trusted GUI for 
transferring data between VMs.  The GUI relies on a file migration policy that takes into account a 
VM's access to the Internet and whether the file is tagged as 'critical' or 'not critical.'  This system relies
on warning a user if moving a file may corrupt or expose files in another area.
SAFE-OS is very similar to Qubes OS with containment and isolation as the conceptual core.  
Unfortunately the project page has been removed from the Laboratoire de Recherche en Informatique 
webpage and it was last archived in 20139; the project is very likely dead.
Rutkowska, J. (2014, August). Software Compartmentalization vs. Physical Separation . 
Retrieved December 5, 2017, from 
https://invisiblethingslab.com/resources/2014/Software_compartmentalization_vs_physical_
8 The appliances themselves are proxied and have no Internet access—indeed even DNS is blocked to remove a possible 
covert channel.
9 https://web.archive.org/web/20130619223002/http://safe-os.lri.fr/
The most recent working version of the project's site in 2013.
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separation.pdf
Joanna Rutkowska is the main developer of Qubes OS.  This paper discusses the vulnerabilities of 
physical separation in securing Tor vs. software compartmentalization of Tor via Qubes OS.  The paper
explains while although some prefer to use physically separate machines (one Tor gateway and one 
client computer), this has the potential to increase the attack surface: we have to worry about potential 
attacks on wifi/ethernet drivers.  The separate Tor process ends up having as much security as the 
manipulatable networking stacks it relies on.  Another known problem is security in USB handling 
when, for example, moving files around.
Qubes OS R2 (we're currently at R3.2) is diagrammed here, addressing the 'Bad Internet' and 'Bad 
USB':
Qubes uses lightweight AppVMs and ServiceVMs.  Qubes mitigates the problems above by isolating 
both the networking and USB stacks in isolated VMs10.  The purpose of isolating and 
compartmentalizing is to lessen the attack surface by reducing the interfaces.  If NetVM is 
compromised, even those VMs that use NetVM are vulnerable as NetVM exposes much less code to 
the other VMs than it does to the “outside world.”11  Given enough development, Rutkowska notes that 
we could eventually remove all AppVM networking code and work instead with inter-VM pipes.
Qubes mitigates attack vectors via drivers or modules in using the UsbVM similarly to how the NetVM
exposes much less to the VMs than would be exposed to an operating system.  
“Primitive “airgap” or “security by virtualization” solutions often attempt to enforce a way too 
10 Introductory information about Qubes may be found in 'Overview - Admin: An Introduction to Qubes' (2016)
11 Rutkowska notes that although MITM attacks with a compromised NetVM would be possible, such attacks like sniffing 
traffic are also possible on local networks—the solution, naturally, is to always encrypt traffic.
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simplistic threat model on the user by enforcing military-style “top-secret/classified/unclassified” 
or simple “work/personal” dual persona models. But typical user workflows are in practice much more 
complex, often involving many more security domains than just two, and typically without any kind of 
simple relation of trust between them.”
This paper is useful in determining whether or not Qubes and other current “reasonably secure” 
operating systems are working towards the security of what we had with Multics or doing something 
entirely different.
Shrobe, H., & Adams, D. (2012). Suppose We Got a Do-Over: A Revolution for Secure 
Computing. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 10(6), 36-39.
“Back in the 70's, computer security was a niche concern; today it affects all of us.”  Howard Shrobe of
DARPA has led two nascent programs that look at how we would design operating system security 
from a clean slate.  A clean slate would not be scrapping all prior knowledge and visionary work but 
rather to design without worrying about supporting legacy architectures—we could be free to “draw 
inspiration from a variety of sources that might help us design secure, resilient systems.”  The first 
creative exercise was to imagine if we had the computing power and the transistors that we enjoy today
back when Multics was so limited by its computing power—how would we design differently?  
Shrobe and Adams took inspiration from computer science research but also from biology.  The 
analogy is illuminating: all biological systems develop in the presence of predators and pathogens 
whereas computer system architectures were developed in benign, isolated environments; biological 
systems have excess of resources whereas computer systems have had limited system resources until 
Moore's law makes resources virtual free; in biology, design is driven by Darwinian pressure whereas 
computer systems have been driven by a market desiring “cheap systems filled with features;” 
ecological pressure has led to diversity in species but in computer science it has led to “virtual 
uniformity in computer design.”  The conclusion in this exercise is that in biology we have innate 
immunity with an additional adaptive immunity to new pathogens: biological systems function even 
though they are constantly under attack whereas computer systems are brittle.
CRASH (Clean-Slate Design of Resilient, Adaptive, and Secure Hosts) is a series of projects that 
address issues in computer security and approach these problems by revisiting earlier computer science 
research into complete mediation, least privilege, and dynamic enforcement.  One project goes in the 
opposite direction from protection rings to capability systems that enforce capability access rights.  
Another project tests all inputs in a crumple zone which is virtual machine with completely mediated 
interactions with the host.
This paper is useful because it helps us to step back and envision the architecture (i.e. a do-over) of 
secure operating systems knowing what we know now and with a clean slate on which to build.  
Schriner 8
Toomey, W. (2010). First Edition Unix: Its Creation and Restoration. IEEE Annals of the 
History of Computing, 32(3), 74-82.  
Upon the resurrection and restoration of the first UNIX's assembly code, Toomey provides the features 
of the first UNIX operating system as well as the philosophical and technical underpinnings—many 
gleaned from Multics and other concomitant operating systems like the Berkeley Time Sharing System.
The first UNIX was on a PDP-7 and had some notable Multics ideas including: a tree-structured file 
system, a command line interface with the name of shell that was borrowed from Multics; text files 
consisting of sequences of characters separated by new lines; and the semantics of I/O operations like 
read and write which would be used to obscure the 'underlying disk blocks' for the user and instead 
refer to file handlers, a buffer, and a count.  Indeed, Dennis Richie notes: “UNIX wasn't quite a 
reaction against Multics.. Multics colored the UNIX approach, but didn't dominate it.” 
The first UNIX brought a vast simplification to I/O semantics:
e.g. ls > xx in UNIX to Multics':
Toomey notes that it's a testament to the system design that nearly four decades after the first UNIX, 
nearly all of the 34 system calls available to the user are still present in the UNIX kernel and similar 
systems: e.g. open(), close(), fork(), wait(), exec().  The first UNIX on the PDP-11/20 was a multi-user 
environment supporting six simultaneous users and a kernel of 4200 lines of assembly code and taking 
up only 16kb of main memory.
Toomey echoes the overarching theme of collaboration in his telling of the history of the first UNIX 
operating system.  Although there was a loss of momentum after losing the Bell Labs funding and 
being denied proposals for the PDP-10 by management, it didn't stop their research.  The first UNIX 
operating system had a “sophisticated environment” for both typists/users and programmers as it 
supported several programming languages.
This paper is useful to our discussion because it helps to reveal, as the restoration of the first edition 
UNIX did, that UNIX developers built atop the legacy of Multics but went in their own direction.  
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Part 3: Current Research
Current research in this area is vast and it grows with each new development in secure operating
systems.  The discussion is prevalent at technology/hacker conventions worldwide.  Researchers often 
present white-papers on their lab webpages or they publish in scholarly journals.  The scholarly 
communication of these researchers has also moved to Twitter and GitHub project pages.  In this way 
the discussion is alive.
There are several conferences where papers like those above are presented.  In New York City, 
there is the bi-annual Hackers On Planet Earth conference, in Las Vegas there is DefCon and BlackHat,
in D.C. there is SchmooCon, and in Germany there is the annual Chaos Communications Congress.  
There are often presentations ranging from pwning devices/automobiles/voting machines, to 
innovations in secure operating systems and the underlying technologies.  ACM and its special interest 
groups host more than 170 computing conferences, workshops, and symposia yearly.12  On the more 
local or regional level we see the planning of BSides.  BSides function as structured or 'unconference' 
events for security-focused talks and workshops.13This is reminiscent of similar events around the 
globe called Cryptoparties in which participants learn and teach the basics of securing their machines 
and communications.14
Several common themes can be extracted from the papers above.  The idea of threat modeling is
something discussed in early secure operating system design—and it continues today.  Threat modeling
can be defined as a consideration of how a system “achieves its security goals under a set of threats” 
(Jaeger, 2008, p. 22).  In discussing Qubes OS, we see that threat modeling (sometimes called an 
Adversary Model) weighs heavily in the design of the operating system components (TorVM, 2017).  




Usually this will include key-signing for GPG, setting up Tor Browser or relays, or booting into Tails.
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machine (Rutkowska, 2012).  An online tool has been developed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
to help users build and assess their threat model and act accordingly.15  “Threat modeling helps you 
identify threats to the things you value and determine from whom you need to protect them” (Assessing
Your Risks, 2017).  With the growing knowledge of NSA and other intelligence agency's penchant for 
mass surveillance (as opposed to targeted surveillance with accountability), more people are becoming 
aware of their security needs and using terms like “threat model” when discussing their 
communications.
@Snowden. (2016, September 29)
Among the most important common themes is the reliance on current research.  Each project 
above is research-driven.  From Qubes OS16, to Tor Project17, to Subgraph18, to Tails19, research drives 
the development.  All of these projects are linked via collaboration with Tor Project—as the Tor 
protocol and Tor Browser are present in each of these distributions.  To look at SAFE-OS above, we 
can piece together how that lab's work informed the work of those trying to scale down or virtualize 
services to limit attack vectors.  Differentiating between most Linux operating systems' reliance on X-
based servers as the GUI-server, Qubes developers furthered the idea of GUI-level isolation that we 
find also in the work above on SAFE-OS.  





“The founders of Subgraph have deep roots in the world of open security research.”
19 https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/Tails_research/
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collaboration.  Open source software and collaboration on projects like Qubes and Tor Project help to 
keep the software up to date and to help developers fix known bugs and vulnerabilities.  Qubes is 
transparent in addressing its vulnerabilities using security bulletins.20 Tor Project, as something that is 
constantly being attacked by nation states with large budgets, necessitates frequent updates and quick 
resolution to vulnerabilities. The executive director of Tor Project, Shari Steele, said: “within the State 
Department there is offensive and defensive. The same branch of the government can be both trying to 
defend the network and trying to go out there and attack other people” (Farivar, 2016).  This cat and 
mouse game leads to the need for constant and timely research from both security labs and academia.
The most influential researchers in this field are currently the many developers involved in 
these projects.  Tor developers include: Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, Isis Lovecruft, Philipp 
Winter, Matt Blaze, and countless others.  Qubes main developer and research Joanna Rutkowska, prior
to Qubes, developed malware called Blue Pill (Greene, 2010) which functioned as a rootkit that ran an 
instance of the OS on a thin hypervisor and then virtualized the rest of the operating systems: this 
effectively meant that anything could be intercepted and, although disputed by others, completely 
undetected (Messmer, 2007).
The idea of a secure operating system didn't end with Multics.  Users nowadays will find that 
after they build their threat model, an operating system that's “reasonably secure” will suffice.  The 
research doesn't stop and the threats don't stop: e.g. Shellshock showed us that no OS is fully secure 
(Stevenson, 2014).  As new anonymizing protocols are adopted and better ways to virtualize services 
are developed, we'll be on our way towards more secure operating systems in a networked world; we'll 
see we need secure operating systems more than ever.
20 https://www.qubes-os.org/security/bulletins/
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A note on citation style: I've preferred to use APA, 6th Edition for References and in-text citations.  
This necessitates repetitive in-text citations because ibid. is not used in APA.  For quick references to 
websites and research portals I've used footnotes for ease of a quick click that doesn't require a full 
reference.  I chose not to double-space the annotated bibliography section so as to have fewer pages.
Further Reading:
In an effort to constrain the number of pages in this paper, the author did not properly discuss Subgraph
OS and Tails, both great “adversary-resistant” operating systems.  Particularly interesting is that 
Subgraph uses LXC and not Xen.  Tails, on the other hand, uses AppArmor.  For further readings on 
these, please consult the following documents:
Subgraph OS Handbook. (n.d.). Retrieved December 1, 2017, from https://subgraph.com/sgos-
handbook/sgos_handbook.pdf
Tails: Privacy for Anyone Anywhere. (n.d.). Retrieved December 13, 2017, from 
https://tails.boum.org/
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